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Abstract
Semi-passive replication is a variant o f passive replication that does not rely on a group membership 
service. Defago et al. [4] defined the semi-passive replication concept in the crash fault model and described 
a semi-passive replication algorithm based on a lazy consensus algorithm. In this paper, we consider semi­
passive replication and lazy consensus for a Byzantine fault model. We present lazy Byzantine consensus 
algorithms for two system models: 1) a system with synchronous communication and partially synchronous 
processing, and 2) an asynchronous system augmented with unreliable fault detectors for Byzantine faults. 
We prove that our algorithms provide safety and liveness. Our algorithms are optimal in good runs, having 
a latency degree o f 2. We describe how our algorithms can be tuned to obtain the desired levels of fault 
resilience or efficiency in the presence o f faults. We also present optimizations to improve the performance 
of the algorithms.
1 Introduction
Replication of critical components is a widely used approach for achieving tolerance of faults. However, 
general approaches to replication are not simple, because of the need to maintain replica consistency. The 
replica consistency problem deals with ensuring that the internal states of all correct replicas in the system 
are consistent with each other. The techniques that have been proposed to solve this problem fall into two 
fundamental classes: active and passive. In active replication (also called the state machine approach), 
e.g., [13], all replicas start with the same initial state, and process client requests in the same order, thus 
maintaining identical internal states. In passive replication (also called the primary-backup approach), e.g., 
[1], only one primary replica processes the client requests and updates the other backup replicas. If the 
primary is faulty, one of the backup replicas is selected to be the new primary.
Both active and passive replication techniques have their advantages and disadvantages. While active 
replication maintains good performance in the presence of failures, it requires that all replicas process each
T his research has been supported by DARPA contract F30602-00-C-0172.
request and that operations on the replicas be deterministic. (Determinism means that the result of an oper­
ation depends only on a replica’s initial state and the sequence of operations that the replica has completed 
so far.) Passive replication, on the other hand, requires less processing power than active replication and 
does not require determinism, but can suffer from poor performance (relative to active replication) in the 
presence of failures. This potential drawback of passive replication has been attributed to its reliance on a 
group membership service to detect failures and reselect the primary replica. To understand this, consider 
that a group membership service excludes the primary from the group whenever it is suspected to have 
crashed and selects a new primary. This reconfiguration of the group can be quite expensive, resulting in 
poor response times to the client. If a conservative failure detection mechanism is used, in order to avoid 
unnecessary reconfigurations, then when the primary does crash, the responsiveness will be poor.
Defago, Schiper, and Sergent defined the semi-passive replication concept in [4, 5,3]. Semi-passive repli­
cation is a technique that retains the principal advantages of passive replication (reduced processing power 
and the no-determinism requirement) and removes the main disadvantage (reliance on a group membership 
service). An additional advantage of semi-passive replication is that the client is oblivious to which server 
replica is the primary replica. The client sends its request to all the replicas, and the failure of the primary 
(or any replica) is transparent to the client process. Hence, in semi-passive replication, there is no need for 
the client to re-issue its request. Defago et al. also presented an algorithm that implements semi-passive 
replication using a sequence of lazy consensus operations. Lazy consensus is similar to standard consensus 
except for one difference: in standard consensus, all processes start with an initial value, whereas in lazy 
consensus, a process obtains its initial value only when necessary. When there are no faults, only the pri­
mary will obtain its initial value. Since obtaining of an initial value is equivalent to a replica’s processing of 
a request, the “laziness” of the consensus results in the “passiveness” of the replication technique.
Defago et al.’s definition of semi-passive replication and lazy consensus, and their algorithms were for the 
fault model in which processes can fail only by crashing. In this work, we consider semi-passive replication 
and lazy consensus for a Byzantine fault model.
The key observation that we used to provide semi-passive replication in the presence of Byzantine faults 
was that having only one primary replica (as in the crash fault model) is not possible, because a Byzantine 
primary process could faithfully send the reply to the client, and send the updates to the backups in time, 
but perform the wrong processing to obtain the reply and the updates. Our solution is based on having a 
primary committee that consists of (t +  1) replicas (where t is the maximum number of replicas that could 
be Byzantine-faulty) and uses authenticated message exchanges. When there are no faults, only the primary 
committee executes requests and updates backups. Such a solution involves much less processing power 
than Byzantine fault-tolerant active replication techniques such as the PBFT algorithm [2], in which all 
correct replicas execute the requests. However, a consequence of using more than one replica to execute 
the request (which is necessary to tolerate Byzantine faults) is that deterministic processing is necessary (as 
in all active replication techniques). We first present a solution that requires determinism, and then later 
discuss how we can do away with that requirement.
2
Our approach to providing a Byzantine fault-tolerant semi-passive replication algorithm is to use a se­
quence of lazy Byzantine consensus algorithms. The lazy Byzantine consensus algorithm requires only the 
primary committee to obtain values and reach a decision when there are no faults. When faults do occur, the 
primary committee is reselected, and the new primary committee tries to reach a decision.
We provide lazy Byzantine consensus algorithms for two system models: 1) the synchronous communi­
cation and partially synchronous processing model [4], and 2) the asynchronous system model augmented 
with unreliable fault detectors for Byzantine faults [10]. Our solutions require only the minimum number 
of processes needed to solve consensus under each of those models. However, the efficiency of the solution 
depends on the number of processes (above the minimum number required) and the policy for reselecting 
the primary committee under faults. We present a few examples to illustrate this fact. We also prove that 
our algorithms satisfy the properties of lazy Byzantine consensus.
2 Semi-Passive Replication in the Byzantine Fault Model
In this section, we define the concept of semi-passive replication in the Byzantine fault model. We also 
define the lazy Byzantine consensus concept, and present a Byzantine fault-tolerant semi-passive replication 
algorithm that is based on the lazy Byzantine consensus algorithm.
2.1 Application Model and Notations
The application model that we consider is the client-server model. The service S  consists of a set of n 
server replicas {pi, • • • ,pn} that are deterministic and initialized to the same internal state. A maximum of 
t among the n server replicas can be Byzantine-faulty. A ¿-subset of S  consists of exactly ¿ distinct server 
replicas. We use S k to denote the set containing all possible ¿-subsets of S. VC denotes the set containing 
all the (t -f- l)-subsets of S  that could constitute primary committees. VC C <Si+1.
For simplicity, we assume that there is a single, non-faulty client denoted by c. Communication between c 
and the individual server replicas is asynchronous and takes place through point-to-point, FIFO, and reliable 
communication channels. Conceptually, we can consider c as a serializing mechanism that accepts requests 
from multiple clients, enforces a total order among the client requests, and forwards the requests to all the 
server replicas. It is easy to see the similarity between c and a real-world corporate gateway.
We use reqk to denote the k th request from c at any server replica. reqk will be the same at all replicas 
(by our assumption of a single, non-faulty client). We use resp\ to denote the response from pi for reqk. 
The response will be signed by p*. The client c accepts a response r  if it has received the identical response 
r  from ¿ - h i  replicas. We use updk to denote the update in the internal state of p* as a consequence of 
processing the request reqk.
2.2 Specification of Byzantine Fault-Tolerant Semi-Passive Replication
We now define semi-passive replication in the Byzantine fault model by the following properties:
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Termination If a correct client sends a request, it eventually accepts a response.
Total Order For any two correct replicas pi and pj, the k th updates to their internal states, upd\ and upd{ 
respectively, are the same.
Update Integrity A correct replica pi executes upd\ at most once, and only if the client sent reqk.
Response Integrity For any response respk corresponding to the request reqk accepted by the client, upd\ 
is executed by some correct replica pi.
Weak Byzantine Parsimony For any two elements V  and Q of VC and for two correct replicas p and q 
such that p G V  A p ^ Q and q G Q A q ^ V, if both p and q process the same request reqk, then at 
least one of the following is true:
• At least one replica in V  is suspected by some other replica in V.
•  At least one replica in Q is suspected by some other replica in Q.
The definitions of the Termination, Total Order, Update Integrity, and Response Integrity properties have 
some words in italics to highlight the differences from the corresponding properties for the crash fault- 
tolerant case given in [3]. The differences are a consequence of the Byzantine fault model, in which faulty 
processes may behave arbitrarily. We define a new Weak Parsimony property1 for a semi-passive replication 
system subject to Byzantine faults. The Parsimony property is used to specify the characteristic that distin­
guishes passive replication from active replication: reduced processing requirements. Normally, in the crash 
fault model, only one replica processes the requests. Our specification for the Byzantine fault model states 
that under normal circumstances, only the (t 4-1) replicas in some element of VC process the requests.
2.3 Lazy Consensus and Lazy Byzantine Consensus
In [3], the semi-passive replication algorithm is expressed as a sequence of (crash fault-tolerant) lazy 
consensus operations. Lazy consensus is a generalization of standard consensus. In the standard consensus 
algorithm, each process starts with an initial value. When the semi-passive replication algorithm is expressed 
as a sequence of lazy consensus algorithms, the decision to be reached by the consensus algorithm is the 
content of the update message that is generated after a request is processed. The contents of the update 
message give the modification to the internal state of a replica as a result of processing the request. If each 
process started with an initial value, then each of them should process the request. However, in that case, the 
replication algorithm would no longer qualify as “parsimonous.” Hence, the computation of an initial value 
is deferred until necessary (hence the name lazy consensus). In the crash-fault-tolerant lazy consensus, this 
means that only the coordinator/primary process computes the initial value in the normal case (i.e., when
'The Weak Parsimony property in the crash fault model [3] states that “if the same request req is processed by two replicas p 
and q, then at least one of p and q is suspected by some replica.”
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there are no faults). Only when the coordinator is faulty (or suspected to be faulty by enough other processes) 
does another process become the coordinator and try to complete the consensus.
We follow a similar approach and express the semi-passive replication algorithm as a series of Byzantine 
fault-tolerant lazy Consensus (henceforth called lazy Byzantine consensus or LBC) algorithms. However, 
instead of having a primary process, we have a primary committee consisting of (t -f 1) processes. (t +  1) is 
the minimum strength of the primary committee required to avoid the case in which the committee consists 
of all Byzantine replicas that faithfully send the required messages to other processes but carry out the 
wrong processing, resulting in wrong responses to client requests and bad updates to other server replicas. 
In lazy Byzantine consensus, only the primary committee computes the initial value in the normal case. 
When a primary committee member suspects another committee member, a new primary committee will be 
selected. The new committee members compute the initial value (if they haven’t done so already) and try to 
complete the consensus. The reselection of the primary committee is the responsibility of the lazy consensus 
algorithm.
Specification of Lazy Byzantine Consensus “Proposing a value” from the point of view of lazy Byzan­
tine consensus is equivalent to “processing a request” from the point of view of semi-passive replication. 
The lazy Byzantine consensus problem defined on the set of server replicas S  is specified by the following 
properties:
Termination Every correct process eventually decides on some value.
Uniform Integrity Every correct process decides at most once.
Agreement No two correct processes decide differently.
Uniform Validity If a correct process decides on v, then v was proposed by some correct process of S. 
Propositional Integrity Every correct process proposes a value at most once.
Weak Byzantine Laziness For any two elements V  and Q of VC and for two correct processes p and q 
such that p e V  A p <£ Q and q E Q A q £ V, if both p and q propose a value, then at least one of the 
following is true:
• At least one process in V  is suspected by some other process in V.
• At least one process in Q is suspected by some other process in Q.
As before, the words in italics highlight the differences from the corresponding properties for the crash 
fault-tolerant lazy consensus given in [3]. The first five properties are known properties for any solution to 
the standard Consensus problem. We define a new Weak Byzantine Laziness property to ensure the Weak 
Byzantine Parsimony property of semi-passive replication. Note that it is possible to define stronger versions 
of the laziness property, but satisfying those properties would require a system in which failures are always
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correctly detected. With the weak Byzantine Laziness property, we allow for incorrect suspicions that may 
lead to the processes in two elements of VC to propose a value.
2.4 The Semi-Passive Replication Algorithm
Our Byzantine fault-tolerant semi-passive replication algorithm is simple because it gives only the client- 
server interaction, and delegates all the complexity in ensuring replica consistency to a lazy Byzantine 
consensus algorithm. We present two LBC algorithms later in Sections 3 and 4. The semi-passive replication 
algorithm is identical to the one presented in [3]; the only difference is that an LBC algorithm is invoked 
instead of a crash-fault-tolerant lazy consensus algorithm. To make this paper self-contained, we briefly 
describe the semi-passive replication algorithm here.
The semi-passive replication algorithm is executed by every server replica. Each replica maintains its own 
receive queue that contains the requests received from the clients and a handled set that contains the requests 
that have been processed. Any new client request (i.e., a request that is not already in the receive queue or in 
the handled set) is appended to the receive queue. A new instance of the lazy Byzantine consensus algorithm 
will be started by an invocation of a function LazyByzConsensus(giv) whenever the preceding instance has 
terminated and the receive queue is not empty. The argument giv (whose name is short for get initial value) is 
a function that computes the initial value and returns it. Since obtaining an initial value (at the LBC level) is 
equivalent to processing the request (at the replication algorithm level), in order to satisfy the parsimonous 
property of semi-passive replication, the giv function must be invoked only by current members of the 
primary committee during the execution of the LBC algorithm. The function giv selects the client request at 
the head of the receive queue, processes the request, and returns the initial value for the Consensus. Since 
the client requests are received in the same order at all processes, all correct processes must have the same 
initial value. The initial value is a 3-tuple containing 1) the selected client request, 2) the update that should 
be applied to the replica state once a decision has been reached, and 3) the response that should be sent to 
the client. When the consensus terminates, based on its decision, each server replica sends its response to 
the client, updates its local state, removes the handled request from the receive queue, and adds the request 
to the handled set. The responses sent to the client are signed by the sending server replicas. The client 
waits for identical responses from (t +  1) server replicas before it accepts the response.
We need to emphasize that our semi-passive replication algorithm relies only on the Laziness property 
of the lazy Byzantine consensus algorithm to satisfy the Parsimony property of semi-passive replication. 
Substituting our lazy Byzantine consensus algorithm with any of the known standard Consensus algorithms 
(e.g., [2, 6, 10, 11]) will not compromise replica consistency, but might lead to a violation of the Parsimony 
property, so that the replication algorithm would no longer be “semi-passive.”
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2.5 Solving the Lazy Byzantine Consensus Problem
As mentioned before, the LBC problem is a generalization of the standard Byzantine Consensus prob­
lem. Hence, the FLP impossibility result [7] applies to the LBC problem. This has the implication that no 
deterministic algorithm can solve LBC in an asynchronous system in the presence of a single faulty process. 
To circumvent this impossibility result, we take the common approach of strengthening the timing assump­
tions of the base asynchronous system model. In particular, we consider two system models: 1) the partial 
synchrony model of Dwork et al. [6], and 2) the asynchronous system model augmented with unreliable 
fault detectors for Byzantine faults [10]. We present a solution to the LBC problem in each of these system 
models next in Sections 3 and 4.
3 Lazy Byzantine Consensus in the Partially Synchronous Processing and Synchronous 
Communication Model
In this section we present an algorithm for lazy Byzantine consensus (LBC) as defined in Section 2.3. 
The algorithm, which we call the LBC-Psync algorithm, is based on the partial synchrony model of Dwork 
et al. given in [6]. We briefly describe the model below.
3.1 System Model
The system of n  server processes, S  — {pi, ■ ■ ■ ,p n}, follows the partial synchrony model of synchronous 
communication and partially synchronous processing [6]. The server processes are connected by a syn­
chronous network. Since we assume synchronous communication, there is a fixed upper bound A on the 
time it takes it takes messages to be delivered. A is known by every process. In particular, no messages are 
lost. In addition, if we assume synchronous processing, there is an upper bound 4>, which is known by every 
process, on the rate at which one processor’s clock can run faster than another’s. However, since we assume 
partially synchronous processing, there is a global stabilization time (GST), unknown to the processes, such 
that the processing respects the upper bound $  from time GST onward.
A correct server process behaves according to its specification; a faulty process doesn’t. Up to t processes 
may be corrupted by an adversary and might behave arbitrarily. We assume authenticated communication, 
in which messages can be signed with the name of the sender process in such a way that the signature cannot 
be forged by any other process. Hence, our fault model is the Authenticated Byzantine fault model. In it, 
the minimum number of processes required to solve consensus is n > 2t [6]. Hence, we require that t < | .
As mentioned in [6], any algorithm that solves Byzantine consensus in the GST model is required to 
satisfy the safety conditions, even if 4> does not hold eventually. On the other hand, the algorithm needs to 
satisfy termination only in case <f> holds eventually.
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3.2 Overview
The key idea in our algorithm is that normally only the t +  1 processes that constitute the primary com­
mittee (denoted by pc) obtain the initial values and send them to all processes. When any process obtains 
identical initial values from it +  1) processes, then it can decide on that value, since at least one of the 
sender processes must be correct and a correct pc member always sends the correct initial value. However, 
if one or more of the pc members are faulty, then the faulty pc members may not send their initial values in a 
timely manner, may not send them at all, or may send the wrong initial value. In such a case, the pc will be 
reselected. Primary committee reselection can be initiated only by a process that is currently a pc member. 
Since at least one process in the pc is correct, if a decision is not reachable, pc reselection will occur. After 
reselection, the new pc members will try to reach consensus and repeat the steps outlined above.
A correct pc member will initiate reselection if 1) it has waited what it thinks is “long enough” without 
receiving the initial values of all the other pc members, 2) the initial value of another pc member differs from 
this pc member’s own initial value (which is not allowed since processing is deterministic, and the client 
requests are serialized in the same order at all processes), or 3) it finds that a fellow pc member has already 
reselected a new pc.
A reselection policy determines what the next pc will be. In other words, the policy defines the elements 
in the set VC and the ordering among them. The policy must be deterministic and identical at all processes. 
We make the following assumption about the reselection policy:
Assumption 1 In an infinitely long run consisting o f infinitely many pc reselection rounds, where at most t 
out o f n processes in S  are faulty and n  >  21, a (t \)-subset o f S  consisting entirely o f correct processes 
must become the pc infinitely often.
Assumption 1 has two consequences:
1. The set VC (defined in Section 2.3) should contain at least one (£+ I)-subset of S  that consists entirely 
of correct processes, irrespective of which processes of S  are faulty, as long as no more than t of them 
are faulty.
2. Each element of VC should be selected as the pc infinitely often in a infinitely long run consisting of 
infinitely many pc reselection rounds.
Later, in Section 3.8, we give some examples of reselection policies that satisfy the above assumption. 
Intuitively, we expect that at some point after the GST, if the pc consists only of correct members, then a 
decision will be reached.
3.3 Notations and Message Types
Each process pi maintains the following data structures:
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• Vi is an n-vector for storing the values proposed by different processes. Specifically, Vi[i\ contains 
Pi s estimate of the decision value. Initially, Vi[j] =_L for all j .
• crii denotes p f  s current committee number (which indicates the pc reselection round number). This 
is initialized to value 0.
• pCi denotes p f  s perception of the primary committee.
• decidedi indicates whether pi has decided. Initially, all processes are undecided and decidedi is, false.
The primary committee corresponding to the committee number crii is obtained by a call to a function 
committee() with crii as the argument, committee(x) for a positive integer x  is a deterministic function that 
gives the pc for the x th round of primary reselection. The reselection policy determines the implementation 
of committee(x).
We use (M )Pi to denote a message M  signed by process pi. Our algorithm uses three message types:
propose: A pc member pi conveys its initial value for consensus to other processes by means of a propose 
message. The message is of the form (PROPOSE, v)Pi, where v indicates the proposed initial value.
decision: When a process has received t +  1 propose messages (possibly including one from itself) that 
have identical initial values, it takes this value as its own decision value. It then sends a decision message 
to all the other processes. The message carries the t + 1 signed proposed values as proof. The message is 
of the form (DECISION, v, proof)Pi, where v is the decision value and “proof’ is the set of signed propose 
messages from t + 1 processes.
reselect: A pc member may initiate reselection of the pc (for any of the three reasons stated above in Section 
3.2) by sending a reselect message to all the processes. The valid reselect message from a process pi is of 
the form (RESELECT, cn^, proof)Pi, where committee(crii) is p f  s newly selected primary committee and 
(pi € committee (crii)) V (pi G committee(cnt - l) ) .  The proof field is null if pi e committee(crii-l)\ 
otherwise, the field should contain a valid reselect message sent by some pj e committee(crii-l). That 
enforces a property of the algorithm, namely that pc reselection can be initiated only by a current pc member 
and should involve the participation of only the current pc members and the next pc members.
3.4 Detailed Description of the Algorithm
We now present the full algorithm that solves lazy Byzantine consensus in the partial synchrony model 
described above, provided that at least of the processes are correct and Assumption 1 holds. The
pseudocode for the full algorithm executed by a process pi is given in Figure 1. We omit details of how we 
check the proper format of each received message. From the point of view of the semi-passive replication 
algorithm, the algorithm in Figure 1 represents the computations at p{ and the communication that takes 
place between the server replica pi and other server replicas in order to service a single client request. In
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Block 1: Initialization
Vi [7] <— ± , for all 0 < j  < n
crii <— 0, pci <— com m ittee(cni), decided, *— false
Block 2: A pc  member obtains its initial value and proposes the value to all 
function propose-now()
Vi[i\ <— g iv ()
send (PROPOSE, VJ[i])Pi to all 
scheduleTimeout( )
Block 3: pi has got propose messages from (t +  1) processes with identical value v  and decides on v 
function decide-now() 
decide(v), decidedi <— true 
send (DECISION, v, proof)Pi to all 
if Pi 6  pci then, cancelTimeout()
Block 4: pc  member pi moves to the next pc reselection round 
function reselect-now() 
cancelTimeoutf )
crii <— crii +  1, pCi committee (crii)
send (RESELECT, crii, proof)Pi to all, with proof =  null
if i(Pi €  pcf) A (Vi[i\ 7  ^ J_) A (decidedi = false)] then, scheduleTimeout()
Block 5: pc  member pi has not proposed or decided yet; hence it proposes 
when [(decidedi =  fa lse ) A (p» € pcf) A (Vi [z] =  _L)] 
propose-now()
Block 6: pi has not decided yet and receives a propose message from p j  
when [(decidedi — false) A (received (PROPOSE, v )Pj from p^)] 
if Vi [7] =  _!_ then 
Vi\j] <- v  
if pi G pc{ then
if Vi [z] — ±  then, propose-now() 
if [(Vi[i\ V i\j\) A (pj €  pcf)] then, reselect-now() 
if [at least (t+1) non-null elements of vector Vi have identical value v] then 
decide-now( )
Block 7: pi has not decided yet and receives a decision message from pj 
when [(decidedi =  false) A (received (DECISION, v, proof)Pj from p3 with valid proof)] 
decide-now( )
Block 8: pi receives a reselect message for the pc reselection round number cru +  1 
when received (RESELECT, cn j, pvoof)Pj for pc reselection round cn3 =  cni + 1
from (p j E co m m ittee(cn j-l))  V (pj E committee(cn-j)) with valid proof 
if pi E pci then, reselect-now() 
else
cni <— cm  -p 1, pCi <— committee (cm ) 
if pi E pci then
send (RESELECT, cni, proof)Pi to all, with proof =  reselect message received from pj 
if [(Vi [z] ^  -L) A (decidedi = false)] then, scheduleTimeout() 
else, forward the reselect message to all
Block 9: pc member pi has proposed but other pc members have not sent their propose messages in time 
when [timeout A (pi E pcf)], reselect-now()
Figure 1. The Lazy Byzantine Consensus Algorithm at a Process pi
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other words, given that the semi-passive replication algorithm is expressed as a sequence of lazy Byzantine 
consensus problems, the following presents the details of how the k th instance of the problem (corresponding 
to the k th client request received) is solved.
A when block of statements is enabled as soon as the guard condition becomes true. The enabled when 
blocks are executed in the order in which they become enabled. We assume that the execution of a when 
block is atomic and not interleaved with the execution of another when block (or another instance of the 
same when block).
The propose-now() function (Block 2) obtains the initial value for the consensus algorithm by invoking 
the giv() function. (This call to the giv function is equivalent, from the semi-passive replication algorithm’s 
perspective, to the processing of a client request.) The giv() function computes a non-null initial value and 
returns it. The obtained initial value is sent in a propose message to all the processes. Only pc members that 
have the null value _L as their initial value and have not yet decided will invoke the propose-now() function 
(from Block 5 and Block 6). To ensure liveness, a pc member that has sent its initial value schedules a 
timeout by which it expects other pc members to send their respective initial values.
The decide-now() function (Block 3) is invoked by any process pi that has received at least t  + 1 propose 
messages with identical values (say v ) either individually or collectively as the proof part of a decision 
message, pi takes v as its decision value (by executing decide(v)), updates decidedi to the true value, and 
sends its own decision message with correct proof to all. Additionally, if pi is a pc member, it cancels the 
timeout it scheduled when it sent out its own propose message or when it switched to the current committee 
number (whichever occurred last).
The reselect-now() function (Block 4) is invoked by a current pc member pi to initiate the next pc rese­
lection round. Since the purpose of a scheduled timeout is to initiate the next pc reselection round if initial 
values have not been received in time from other pc members, a timeout previously scheduled but hasn’t 
yet expired is now unneeded, and is therefore cancelled. The function increments the committee number 
crii, updates the primary committee p c and sends a reselect message with the new committee number to 
all the processes. Since pi was a pc member when invoking the function, the reselect message does not need 
any proof. Additionally, if Pi is a member of the new pc as well, and has already sent its initial value, it 
schedules a timeout by which it expects to receive the initial values from the members of the new pc.
In Block 5, pi invokes the propose-now() function if it is a pc member, and has not yet decided or 
proposed.
Block 6 describes the actions taken when pi has not yet decided and receives a propose message from 
process pj for the first time, pi updates the j th element in the Vi vector. If pi is a pc member and has not 
yet sent its propose message, it does so now; it then checks whether its initial value and p j’s initial value 
are the same. If the values are different (indicating that pj is faulty) and pj is currently a pc member, p{ 
initiates the next pc reselection round by calling the function reselect-now(). The check to see whether p0 is 
a pc member prevents the situation in which a malicious pj that is not currently a pc member sends a wrong 
initial value to initiate pc reselection when all the pc members are correct. Finally, pi checks whether it has
obtained (t +  1) propose messages with identical values; if it has, it invokes the decide-now function.
In Block 7, if  pi receives a valid decision message with valid proof in the form of (¿ +  1) propose messages 
with identical values of v, then pi invokes the decide-now() function.
As described in Section 3.3, a reselect message for a new pc reselection round cnj can be sent by process 
P j  only if it is a member of committee(crij), a member of committee(crij-1), or both. If pj is a member of 
committee(crij) but not a member of committee (crij-1), the reselect message must carry a valid proof in 
the form of another reselect message sent by some process pk that is a member of com mittee(crij-l). Block 
8 describes pds reaction to a valid reselect message for a new pc reselection round crii +  1 from process pj. 
If pi is currently a pc member, it invokes the reselect-now() function, which increments crii, updates pcit and 
sends its own reselect message for that reselection round. If pi is not currently a pc member, it increments 
crii, updates pcif and checks to see whether it is a member of the pc corresponding to the new reselection 
round. If it is a member of the new pc, then pi sends a reselect message with pj's reselect message as proof. 
Additionally, if Pi has already sent its propose message (in some previous reselection round in which it was 
a pc member), it schedules a timeout by which it expects to hear from other members of the new pc about 
their initial values. If pi is a member of neither the old pc nor the new pc, then pi immediately relays p j ’s 
reselect message to all the processes. This forwarding of p / s  reselect message to all the processes by pi 
prevents situations in which pj is a malicious pc member sending a reselect message for a new pc reselection 
round to only a subset of correct processes. The forwarding is not necessary when pi is a pc member or a 
member of committee(crij), because in those cases, pi will have to send its own reselect message.
Block 9 shows that if pi is a pc member and has waited long enough but still hasn’t been able to decide on 
a value (because (t +  1) propose messages with identical values have not yet been received), then pi initiates 
the next pc reselection round.
3.5 Example Scenarios
Figure 2(a) presents an execution of the LBC-Psync algorithm when a client request is received at three 
server processes p0, pi, and p2. The primary committee consists of p0 and pi. p0 and pi process the request 
to obtain the same initial value which they send in a propose message to all the processes. Once a process 
receives propose messages from both the pc members with identical values, it decides on that value, and 
sends a decision message to all the processes.
Figure 2(b) presents another execution of the LBC-Psync algorithm when a client request is received at 
three server processes, but in this case, one of the pc members, namely p0, is Byzantine-faulty. Both the 
pc members, po and p\ process the request to obtain their initial values, but p0 sends the wrong value in 
its propose message to all the processes. When pi receives this message, it initiates the next round of pc 
reselection. The reselection policy is such that (in this example) pi and p2 become the pc members in that 
round. After becoming a pc member, p2 processes the request and sends out its propose message. Since p2 
had already received p i ’s propose message with initial value identical to its own initial value, it decides on
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Client Request
Client Request
(a) Normal Case: No Faults and <f> Holds (b) Malicious Behavior of p0
Figure 2. Example Scenarios for the LBC-Psync Algorithm
that value, and sends out a decision message. Similarly, when p\ receives p2’s propose message, it decides, 
and send out a decision message.
3.6 Safety and Liveness of the LBC-Psync algorithm
In this section, we will sketch the proofs that the LBC-Psync algorithm satisfies safety and liveness 
properties. First, we observe from Figure 1 that there are only three places in the algorithm where a correct 
pc member will invoke the reselect-now() function to switch to the next pc reselection round and send a 
reselect message to all the processes. This observation could be stated as follows:
Observation 1 There are only three cases in which a correct pc member pi will initiate the next pc reselec­
tion round. They are (1) a timeout occurs (Block 9), which means that pi has waited what it thinks is “long 
enough’’ and has not yet received the initial value o f the other pc members, (2) the initial value o f some 
fellow pc member differs from its own initial value (Block 6), or (3) it finds that a fellow pc member has 
already reselected a new pc (Block 8).
Lemma 3.1: After GST, if the pc consists entirely of correct processes, then no further pc reselection rounds 
will occur.
Proof (Sketch): We prove this lemma by showing that the three situations in Observation 1 are not
possible when, sometime after GST, the pc consists entirely of correct processes.
Case (1) will not occur since all the members will (by the algorithm specification) send their initial values 
through propose messages if they have not already done so and because all pc members will receive the 
initial values of other members in a timely manner, since <f> holds.
Case (2) will not occur because processing is deterministic, and the client requests are serialized in the 
same order at all processes. Hence, the initial values of all correct processes will be the same.
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Because case (1) and case (2) are not possible and since all other pc members are correct, a pc member 
will have no reason to initiate a new pc reselection round. Hence, a correct pc member will not receive a 
reselect message from another pc member. Thus, case (3) is also not possible. Hence, after GST, if the pc 
consists entirely of correct processes, no further pc reselection will occur. □
Lemma 3.2: If GST exists, then the number of pc reselection rounds after GST is finite.
Proof (Sketch): The reselection policy (by Assumption 1) guarantees that there is at least one (t + 1)-
subset consisting entirely of correct processes (say P ) that is an element of VC. The policy also guarantees 
that in a run of infinitely many reselection rounds, P  will become the primary committee infinitely often. 
Hence, if GST exists, P  must become the primary committee some time after GST. From Lemma 3.1, 
it follows that once P  becomes the primary committee after GST, then there will be no more reselection 
rounds. Hence, the number of pc reselection rounds after GST is finite. □
Theorem 3.3: Every correct process eventually decides on some value. (Termination)
Proof (Sketch): It is easy to see that if any correct process decides, it sends a decision message to all the
processes. Since messages are not lost, eventually all correct processes will receive this message and also 
decide.
Now let us consider the case in which no correct process decides. Since the pc consists of (¿+1) members, 
it must have at least one correct member. This correct member will timeout (Block 9) and initiate the next 
pc reselection round. By Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2, it follows that the latest time when any correct process 
will have to wait until before deciding would be the time when an all-correct-(£ +  l)-subset becomes the pc 
after GST. Hence, termination is satisfied. □
Theorem 3.4: Every correct process decides at most once. (Uniform Integrity)
Proof (Sketch): When a correct process pi decides on a value v, it updates decidedi to true. The only
place in our algorithm where this update is done is in the decide-now() function (Block 3). The function is 
invoked at only two places in the algorithm: Block 6 and Block 7. Those blocks are executed only when the 
value of decidedi is false. Hence every correct process decides at most once. □
Theorem 3.5: If a correct process decides on v, then v was proposed by some correct process of S.
(Uniform Validity)
Proof (Sketch): A correct process pi decides on a value v by calling the decide-now() function (Block
3). The function is invoked only after pi has received at least t +  1 valid propose messages with identical 
values (say v ) either individually (Block 6) or collectively as the proof part of a decision message (Block 
7). In both cases, at least one of the t + 1 propose messages must be from a correct process. Thus, Uniform 
Validity is satisfied. □
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Theorem 3.6: No two correct processes decide differently. (Agreement)
Proof (Sketch): Let us assume that two correct processes pi and pj decide on different values v\ and v2,
respectively. We show by contradiction that this is not possible.
Uniform Validity states that for pi to have decided on at least one correct process must have proposed 
v\. Similarly, for pj to have decided on v2, at least one correct process must have proposed v2. However, 
all correct processes will propose the same value, because of the assumption of deterministic processing. 
Hence v\ = v2, a contradiction. □
Theorem 3.7: Every correct process proposes a value at most once. (Propositional Integrity)
Proof (Sketch): A correct process pi proposes a value by calling the propose-now() function. The
function updates Vi[i\ to a non-null value returned by the giv() function. Once Vj\i\ is set to a non-null value, 
it never becomes null again. Since the propose-now() function is invoked in Block 5 and Block 6 only if 
Vi[i\ is null, it follows that pi proposes a value at most once. □
Theorem 3.8: For any two elements V  and Q of VC and for two correct processes p  and q such that
p & V  A p  £ Q and q e  Q / \q  V , i f  both p  and q propose a value, then at least one of the following is 
true:
• at least one process in V  is suspected by some other process in V.
• at least one process in Q is suspected by some other process in Q. (Weak Byzantine Laziness)
Proof (Sketch): Let us assume that neither (I) nor (II) is true. We prove that this is not possible by
contradiction.
In the context of the LBC-Psync algorithm, when a correct pc member “suspects” a fellow pc member, 
it initiates the next pc reselection round. Hence, the situations in which a pc member suspects a fellow pc 
member are the three cases given in Observation 1. Conversely, a correct pc member initiates the next pc 
reselection round only if it suspects a fellow pc member due to one of those three cases.
We can assume, without loss of generality, that V  precedes Q in the reselection rounds. That is, if 
committee(ni) — V  and committee(ri2) =  Q, then n\ < n 2.
A correct process proposes a value by invoking the propose-now() function in Block 5 and Block 6 only 
if it is currently a pc member. That is, p proposes its value only when V  is the pc (since p £ Q), and 
q proposes its value only when Q is the pc (since q ^ V). Since q proposes a value, it must be a pc 
member, which means that reselection round number n 2 must have been initiated by some member of the 
pc corresponding to reselection round number n 2 — 1. By induction on the difference n 2 — m , we can see 
that for the reselection round number n2 to be initiated, the reselection round number m  +  1 must have 
been initiated some time before. However, only an element r  of V  can initiate the reselection round number 
ni -t- 1. Depending on whether r  is correct, we will have one or the other of the following two situations:
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(i) If r  is correct, then it must have initiated the reselection round number m  +  1 only because it suspects 
some other member of V.
(ii) If r  is faulty and was the first member of V  to send a reselect message for the reselection round number 
n i +  1. Then, any correct process that receives this message will either send its own reselect message or 
forward r ’s reselect message to all the processes. Thus, p  will come to suspect r  from case (3) in Observation 
1.
In both (i) and (ii) above, condition (I) is true, which is a contradiction. □
3.7 Safety and Liveness of the Semi-Passive Replication Algorithm
In this section, we show that if our semi-passive replication algorithm instantiates a sequence of LBC- 
Psync algorithms (one for each client request, with the next instance created after the current instance ter­
minates), then the semi-passive replication algorithm satisfies the specifications given in Section 2.2.
Termination of the replication algorithm follows directly from the termination of the LBC-Psync algo­
rithm. From Theorem 3.3, the client will eventually receive responses from each of the correct replicas. 
From Theorem 3.6, it can be seen that all correct replicas send identical responses. Since there are at least 
t +  1 correct replicas, the client will eventually receive at least t 4- 1 responses with identical result and 
accept that result.
The Total Order property of the replication algorithm follows from 1) the fact that the k th client request 
at all the replicas is the same, 2) and the Agreement property of the LBC-Psync algorithm.
Update Integrity of the replication algorithm can be shown as follows: A correct replica p{ will execute 
upd\ only after a decision has been reached in the k th instance of the LBC-Psync algorithm. However, for a 
decision to be reached, at least t + 1 processes must have proposed an initial value (they must have processed 
the request reqk). At least one of those t +  1 processes must be correct. A correct process will process a 
request only if it receives the request. Hence, it is clear that pi executes upd\ only if the client sent reqk. 
After executing upd\, replica^ will remove reqk from its receive queue and add the request to the handled 
set (see Section 2.4). Thus, the request will not be handled again, and hence upd\ will be executed at most 
once by pi.
Response Integrity of the replication algorithm can be shown as follows: For any response to be accepted 
by the client, at least one correct replica must have processed the request, proposed an initial value for 
consensus, and decided on that value. After deciding on the value, the correct replica will update its internal 
state. Therefore, for any response respk corresponding to the request reqk accepted by the client, upd\ will 
be executed by some correct replica pi.
The Weak Byzantine Parsimony property of the replication algorithm follows from the Weak Byzantine 
Laziness property of the LBC-Psync algorithm, since “processing a request” at the replication algorithm 
level is equivalent to “proposing a value” at the LBC-Psync algorithm level.
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3.8 Factors Influencing the Efficiency of the LBC-Psync Algorithm
As proved in Section 3.6, if at some point after the GST, the pc consists only of correct members, 
then a decision will be reached. The maximum number of reselection rounds after GST (let us call this 
max-rounds) required for an element of VC, say P, that consists entirely of correct processes to become 
the primary committee is an important measure of the efficiency of the LBC algorithm, max-rounds gives 
the upper bound on the number of reselection rounds after GST before a correct process can make a decision. 
In this section, we present examples to illustrate the factors that determine max-rounds.
Consider the case in which the fault resilience is optimal, i.e., n =  2t +  1. Consider a reselection policy 
such that the set VC = S t+1, \VC\ = C f+ j1, and each element of VC is chosen exactly once in C f ^ 1 
reselection rounds in some order that is identical across all replicas. It can be seen that this reselection 
policy satisfies Assumption 1. In this case, although the fault resilience is optimal, max-rounds is rather 
large and is equal to Ci2£ |1. This value for max-rounds is obtained by considering the worst case of t faults, 
where there is only one element of VC that consists entirely of correct processes, and that element is chosen 
in the last of reselection rounds.
We now obtain the value of max-rounds for a more general case. Let n  be any value greater than 2t. Let 
/  be the actual number of faulty processes. Consider a reselection policy such that the set VC =  S t+1, and 
each element of VC is chosen exactly once in \VC\ reselection rounds in some order that is identical across 
all replicas. Then, max-rounds = [Cj*+1 -  C?+/]. Here, is the number of elements of VC that consist 
entirely of correct processes. In the worst case, the reselection policy chooses all the elements of VC that 
have at least one faulty process, before choosing any of the elements that consist entirely of correct
processes.
Now, consider another case in which the reselection policy is implemented by having committee(x) 
return the set { P x  mod n iP (x- \ -1) mod  n > " >P(x-\-t) mod  n }  t he  p c  for the reselection round x. In the worst
case, the t corrupted processes could be at “distance” t from each other ( { p t , p 2t + \ ,  ■ ■ • , p t2+ t _ 1} ) .  The 
minimum value of n required for the reselection policy to satisfy Assumption 1 is n =  t2 +  t +  1. If 
/  is the number of actual faults ( /  <  t), then max-rounds =  /  • t -f / .  Specifically, if f  = t, then 
max-rounds — t 2 -\-t.
We have presented a few examples that show that the reselection policy, the number of processes, the 
maximum number of faulty processes, and the actual number of faulty processes are all factors that influence 
the efficiency of the LBC-Psync algorithm. By careful selection of the reselection policy, it is possible to 
tune the algorithm for desired levels of resilience or efficiency.
3.9 Latency Degree
In [12], Schiper introduced the concept of latency degree to measure the efficiency of a distributed algo­
rithm. Informally, the latency degree of a consensus algorithm is the minimum number of communication 
steps over all possible runs, which is typically obtained in good runs. A good run is a run with no faults and
17
no suspects. Our LBC-Psync algorithm has a latency degree of 2. There are only two communication steps 
in a good run (as shown in Figure 2(a)):
1. A pc member sends its propose message with its initial value to all.
2. Once a process has received propose messages with identical initial values from all the (£+1) pc members, 
it sends a decision message to all, and decides.
A latency degree of 2 is optimal [8]. Hence, our LBC-Psync algorithm is optimal in the number of 
communication steps in good runs.
3.10 Optimizations
We now present some optimizations that can be used to improve the performance of the LBC-Psync 
algorithm (and hence the semi-passive replication algorithm).
From the point of view of the semi-passive replication algorithm, the overhead involved to “settle” on 
an all-correct-(t +  l)-subset (as the pc) after GST could easily be made a one-time overhead, by carrying 
over the knowledge of the latest primary committee from one instance of the consensus problem to the next 
instance of the consensus problem.
A second optimization can be used to restrict the number of rounds taken to reach decision to 0{t )  for 
any n  > 21. First, we observe that a process can make a decision as soon as it gets (t  +  1) propose messages 
with identical values. Second, we observe that the propose messages sent by any correct process will have 
the same value as the propose message of any other correct process. These observations mean that a decision 
could be reached as soon as (t -I- 1) correct processes send their propose messages. For that reason, instead 
of needing to wait to “settle” on an all-correct-(£ + l)-subset, it is enough to perform the minimum number 
of pc reselections required to “cover” (£ +  1) correct processes. Suppose we have a reselection policy such 
that the set VC =  S t+1, and each element of VC is chosen exactly once \n\VC\ reselection rounds in some 
order that is identical across all replicas. It can be easily seen that irrespective of the value of n  (as long 
as n > 21), the minimum number of pc reselections required to “cover” (i-f-1) correct processes is only 
2t + 1. Hence, if we require that a process pi upon becoming a pc member for the first time, immediately 
obtain its initial value and send a propose message, then a decision can be reached at the end of (2t +  1) pc 
reselection rounds. However, if the algorithm is made to terminate as soon as a decision has been reached, 
then this optimization should not be used in conjunction with the first optimization, because at termination, 
it may be that not all reselect messages have been delivered. Hence the pc information should not be carried 
over to the next instance of the consensus problem; rather, each instance of the consensus problem should 
start from the same pc.
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4 Lazy Byzantine Consensus in an Asynchronous System with Unreliable Fault Detectors 
for Byzantine Faults
In this section, we present a algorithm that solves the lazy Byzantine consensus problem in the asyn­
chronous system model augmented with unreliable fault detectors for Byzantine faults [10].
4.1 System Model
The system consisting of the n server processes, S, is an asynchronous system with no bounds on message 
delivery times and relative processor speeds. The server processes communicate with each other through 
reliable communication channels. Reliable means that messages exchanged between correct processes are 
eventually received and are not modified by the underlying communication medium. We do not consider 
network partitions. Processes have access to local clocks, which are not synchronized.
Processes could be correct or faulty. A correct process conforms to its specification, and a faulty process 
can behave arbitrarily. We allow up to t processes to be faulty, and require that t < | . Thus, at least |~^ +1] 
processes are correct. We assume authenticated communication so that messages can be signed with the 
name of the sending process in such a way that the signature cannot be forged by any other process. Thus, 
our fault model is the Authenticated Byzantine fault model [6],
4.2 Unreliable Fault Detectors for Byzantine Faults
In [10], Kihlstrom et al. defined the <>5(Byz) class of fault detectors for Byzantine faults. Here, we 
briefly describe their work and propose an extension to define a new OS'(LazyByz) class of fault detectors 
that can be used for solving lazy Byzantine consensus.
Kihlstrom et al. identified the following completeness and accuracy properties of fault detectors for solv­
ing consensus in a Byzantine environment:
Eventual Strong Byzantine Completeness There is a time after which every process in S  that has exhib­
ited a detectable Byzantine fault is permanently suspected by every correct process.
Eventual Weak Byzantine (t +  1 )-Completeness There is a time after which every process in S  that has 
exhibited a detectable Byzantine fault is permanently suspected by at least t + 1 correct processes.
Eventual Weak Accuracy There is a time after which some correct process in S  is never suspected by any 
correct process.
The <>W(Byz) class of Eventually Weak Byzantine fault detectors satisfies the Eventual Weak Byzantine 
(t + 1 ^Completeness and the Eventual Weak Accuracy properties above. The O'S'(Byz) class of Eventually 
Strong Byzantine fault detectors satisfies the Eventual Strong Byzantine Completeness and the Eventual 
Weak Accuracy properties.
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In the properties defined above, the term detectable Byzantine fault is used to indicate omission and 
commission faults. An omission fault occurs when a process does not send a required message to one or 
more correct processes. A commission fault occurs either when 1) a process sends messages that contain 
a valid signature but are improperly formed or contain improper proofs, or 2) a process sends two or more 
mutant messages. Two or more messages are said to be mutants if they are of the proper form, have proper 
proofs, have the same source, and have the same round/phase, but have different contents. If a correct process 
Pi  has noticed that another process p j  is exhibiting a commission fault, then p i  will permanently suspect p j .  
Process pi will also send to all other processes the proof that pj has exhibited a commission fault; then, 
all correct processes will receive this proof, declare pj to be Byzantine-faulty, and permanently suspect 
Pj .  Detectable Byzantine faults are different from non-detectable Byzantine faults in that non-detectable 
Byzantine faults cannot be attributed to a particular process and are not observable by a process based on 
the messages it receives.
In [10], Kihlstrom et al. showed 1) that O ^(B yz) fault detectors are the weakest class of failure detectors 
that can be used to solve Byzantine consensus in asynchronous systems, and 2) that a OkL(Byz) fault detec­
tor can be transformed into a <>5(Byz) fault detector. They presented a three-phased consensus algorithm 
based on the rotating coordinator (primary process) paradigm, in which termination is guaranteed by the 
Eventual Weak Accuracy property. Intuitively, we can see that consensus will be reached when the correct 
process that is not suspected by any other correct process becomes the coordinator.
However, in lazy Byzantine consensus, we do not have a single coordinator, but a (i +  1) committee of 
primary processes. The Eventual Weak Accuracy condition stated above does not ensure termination even 
if the reselection policy guarantees that an element of VC (say P ) consisting entirely of correct processes 
will become the pc infinitely often (as stated by Assumption 1). The reason is that the Eventual Weak 
Accuracy property only guarantees that (eventually) some correct process will never be suspected by any 
correct process. The other t correct members of V  could be suspected forever by enough other members 
such that the lazy Byzantine consensus algorithm might never terminate. Hence, we define a new Eventual 
Weak Lazy Byzantine Accuracy property as follows:
Eventual Weak Lazy Byzantine (t +  1)-Accuracy There is a time after which none of the processes in 
some set V  € VC are ever suspected by a majority of correct processes.
We define <>5(LazyByz) to be the class of unreliable fault detectors that satisfy Eventual Strong Byzan­
tine Completeness and Eventual Weak Lazy Byzantine (t +  1)-Accuracy.
4.3 A Lazy Byzantine Consensus Algorithm using OS(LazyByz)
We call this algorithm the LBC-<§>S(LazyByz) algorithm. The LBC-<>5(LazyByz) algorithm is very sim­
ilar to the LBC-Psync algorithm, except for the following differences:
1. The LBC-OSiByz) algorithm does not directly employ timeouts, as the timeouts are abstracted away
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in the unreliable fault detector. Hence, the algorithm makes no calls to the scheduleTimeout() and 
cancelTimeout() functions.
2. In the LBC-psync algorithm, one of the three triggers that will cause a pc member pi to initiate the 
next pc reselection round is the occurrence of a timeout before pi has received the propose message 
from all the other pc members with the same initial value as its own (case 1 in Observation 1). In the 
LBC-OSTLazyByz) algorithm, we use the following trigger instead: if pc member p* finds that any 
other pc member is currently suspected by [ ^ J  + l distinct processes possibly including pi (which is 
equivalent to a majority of correct processes), then it initiates the next pc reselection round.
3. An additional trigger for pi to initiate the next pc reselection round is the exhibition of a commission 
fault by a fellow pc member. If that happens, p* does not have to wait for suspects from |_t2±lj+] 
processes.
Hence, observation 1 in the LBC-Psync algorithm could be restated for the LBC-<>5(LazyByz) algorithm 
as follows:
Observation 2 There are only four cases in which a correct pc member pi will initiate the next pc reselection 
round. They are (1) a fellow pc member is currently suspected by \ p ^ \  +1 distinct processes, (2) the initial 
value o f some fellow pc member differs pfis own initial value, (3) a fellow pc member has exhibited a 
commission fault, or (4) pi finds that a fellow pc member has already reselected a new pc.
4.4 Implementing a O-S'iLazyByz) Fault Detector
In [10], Kihlstrom et al. described the implementation of a <>5(Byz) class Byzantine fault detector under 
partial synchrony assumptions [6] at each process pi that outputs a list of processes that p* currently suspects 
of having exhibited a detectable Byzantine fault. We assume a similar implementation of a <>5(LazyByz) 
fault detector module in each of our server replicas. We also require another easily implementable feature, 
namely that when the fault detector module at a process pi begins to suspect a process pj, process pi will 
send a signed added-suspect(pj) message to all processes. Later, when the fault detector module at pi 
stops suspecting process pj (maybe temporarily), process p* will send a removed-suspect(pj) message to 
all processes. If p* has detected that pj exhibited a commission fault, it will send an added-suspect(pj) 
message, but it will never send a removed-suspect(pj) message, p* will also send the proof that p3 has 
exhibited a commission fault to all the processes.
We also follow Kihlstrom’s method [9] for masking a fault in which a Byzantine process sends a message 
to some correct process but not to others. We do so by requiring that any correct process that receives a 
message for the first time must immediately relay it to all processes.
Additionally, we require that each process maintain a bit matrix of suspects called the suspect-matrix. 
The cell suspect-matrix[i][j] of the matrix at a process pk is set when pk receives an added-suspect(pj)
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message from process p i; the cell is reset when pk receives a removed-suspect(pj) message from process p*. 
The added-suspect and removed-suspect messages will be signed by the sender and timestamped with the 
sender’s local clock. That means that if an added-suspect(pj) from process pt is forwarded to process pk (by 
some process other than p^, but a more recent (determined from the timestamp) removed-suspect(pj) has 
been received at pk, then pk will ignore the added-suspect(pj) message. Thus, process pk can determine the 
number of processes currently suspecting pj (based on the messages received so far) by checking the f h 
column of the matrix. If pk and pj are current pc members, and pk, based on its suspect-matrix finds that pj 
is suspected by |_ ^ J  +1 distinct processes, then pk will initiate the next pc reselection round.
In the LBC-Psync algorithm, it was the responsibility of the correct member(s) in the pc to ensure progress 
by initiating the next pc reselection round, if the pc member has not received the initial value from some 
faulty pc member. The correct pc member relies on local timeouts to decide whether it has waited “long 
enough” before it initiates the next pc reselection round. In the LBC-<>5'(LazyByz) algorithm, again, only 
a current pc member p* can initiate the next pc reselection round. However, to detect omission faults of a 
fellow pc member, p* relies not only on its local fault detector module, but also on the messages from the 
fault detector modules at other processes. For that purpose, when any process p* (pc member or not) switches 
to a new pc, it schedules a timeout by which it expects to get a propose message from all pc members that 
have not hitherto sent such a message. If p* is a pc member and has not sent its propose message before, it 
sends the message before scheduling the timeout. If any pc member pj does not send its propose message 
before the timeout expires, then that member will be suspected by the fault detector module, and a signed 
added-suspect(pj) message will be sent to all the processes. If the propose message sent by a correct pj is 
delayed in reaching p*, either because pj is temporarily slow or because the message transmission is slow, 
then pi may incorrectly come to suspect pj. Such incorrect suspicions are allowed by the properties of the 
fault detector. If pj acts in a timely manner in later pc reselection rounds, p* will remove the suspicion for 
P j.  As in the LBC-Psync algorithm, a timeout set for the current pc is cancelled when a decision is reached 
or when a new pc reselection round is initiated.
4.5 Safety and Liveness of the LBC-OS^LazyByz) Algorithm
The proofs to show that the LBC-OS'(LazyByz) algorithm satisfies the Uniform Integrity, Uniform Va­
lidity, Agreement, and Propositional Integrity properties are identical to the corresponding proofs for the 
LBC-Psync algorithm.
The termination of the LBC-Psync algorithm is conditional upon the existence of GST. Similarly, the 
termination of the LBC-<>5(LazyByz) algorithm is conditional upon the Eventual Weak Lazy Byzantine 
{t +  1)-Accuracy property of the OS(LazyByz) fault detector. Proceeding as we did in Lemma 3.1, we can 
show using Observation 2 that if there is a time r  after which all the processes in some set V  e  VC are 
never suspected by a majority of correct processes, then no further pc reselection rounds will occur. By 
Assumption 1 of the reselection policy, V  must become the primary committee some time after r .  This
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implies that the number of pc reselection rounds after r  will be finite. Thus, each process will eventually 
decide on some value.
The Weak Byzantine Laziness property of the LBC-^S^LazyByz) algorithm can be proved much like the 
LBC-Psync algorithm, but using Observation 2 instead of Observation 1.
4.6 Efficiency, Latency Degree, and Optimizations
In Section 3.8, we observed that the reselection mechanism, the maximum number of faulty processes, the 
actual number of faulty processes, and the number of processes are the factors that influence the efficiency 
of the LBC-Psync algorithm. The same observation applies to the LBC-O^LazyByz) algorithm (with 
the exception that n  must be greater than 31 for the LBC-<>S,(LazyByz) algorithm). Like the LBC-Psync 
algorithm, the LBC-<>5(LazyByz) algorithm has a latency degree of 2. The optimizations presented in 
Section 3.10 can also be applied to the LBC-0£,(LazyByz) algorithm.
5 Non-Determinism
One of the advantages of passive replication over active replication in the crash fault model is that passive 
replication does not require the replicas to be deterministic. However, in our Byzantine fault-tolerant semi­
passive replication algorithm, because we use a primary committee (instead of a single primary process as 
in the crash fault model), the replicas need to be deterministic. In particular, the initial values of all correct 
replicas for a particular instance of the lazy Byzantine consensus algorithm need to be the same. That is 
a drawback, since there are many services that are non-deterministic. For example, if the replicas want to 
reach a decision on the time at which a particular transaction took place (based on a client query), their 
initial values could differ if each replica obtains the time only from its local clock.
To tackle such situations, we follow an approach similar to that of [2], and add an extra communication 
step to our consensus protocol: the pc members first send their initial values (that could be different across 
correct pc members) to all the processes. Then, each pc member chooses a consolidated initial value by 
applying a deterministic function on the set of values obtained from all the pc members (e.g., the average 
of values). This consolidated initial value will be the value that is sent in the propose message. In order to 
prevent the situation in which the pc consists of t faulty members that faithfully send their messages in time, 
but try to bias the consolidated initial value, a correct pc member could initiate the next pc reselection round 
if it finds that the consolidated initial value is not within an e bound of its original initial value. The value 
of e should be given by the service specification.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we presented specifications for Byzantine fault-tolerant semi-passive replication and lazy 
Byzantine consensus. We described an algorithm for Byzantine fault-tolerant semi-passive replication based
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on a series of lazy Byzantine consensus algorithms. We then presented the LBC-Psync algorithm for lazy 
Byzantine consensus in the partial synchrony model of [6] and the LBC-05(LazyByz) algorithm for lazy 
Byzantine consensus in an asynchronous system augmented with unreliable fault detectors. We specified an 
extension to Kihlstrom et al.’s OS(Byz) class of unreliable fault detectors to solve lazy Byzantine consensus.
We also proved that our consensus algorithms provide safety and liveness. Our algorithms are optimal 
in good runs, having a latency degree of 2. We also used examples to show, how the reselection policy can 
be appropriately chosen so as to tune the algorithm for either optimal fault resilience or efficiency in the 
presence of faults. We presented optimizations to improve the performance of the algorithms.
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